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Europos Sąjungos vizija: rinkimų į Europos Parlamentą 
kampanijų pristatymas Lenkijos spaudoje
Santrauka. 2019 m. Europos Parlamento (EP) rinkimai sutapo su diskusijomis dėl Eu-
ropos integracijos modelio reformos, kurias skatino pabėgėlių krizė ir „Brexitas“. Šiame 
straipsnyje autorės kelia klausimą, ar europiniai procesai atsispindi nacionalinių partijų 
programose ir tiria Lenkijos politinių partijų 2019 m. rinkimų į EP programų reprezentaciją 
šalies žiniasklaidoje. Tyrimo tikslas yra atskleisti, kaip žiniasklaida pristatė šias pro-
gramas (formavo žiniasklaidos darbotvarkę). Siekiant suprasti žiniasklaidos darbotvarkės 
išskirtinumą, atlikta politinių partijų programų analizė. Tyrimo modelis pagrįstas 
darbotvarkės sudarymo („agenda-setting“) teorija. Empiriniame skyriuje pateikiami tiek 
žiniasklaidos, tiek politinės darbotvarkės kiekybinės ir kokybinės analizės rezultatai, pat-
virtinantys jų tarpusavio neatitikimą.
Reikšminiai žodžiai: rinkimų kampanija, Europos Parlamentas, Lenkija, darbotvarkės 
sudarymas, politinė darbotvarkė, žiniasklaidos darbotvarkė.
Introduction
Elections are a special time for the media, forcing a stronger media 
message that focuses on events occurring on the political scene. This 
applies to elections at various levels, including the level of the only 
representative body in the European Union, the European Parliament.
The Poles have already elected their representatives to the EP four 
times – on June 13, 2004, June 7, 2009, May 25, 2014, and May 26, 
2019. European elections preceded the national elections three times 
(the parliamentary elections in September 2005, presidential in June 
and municipal in November 2010, and parliamentary in October 
2019). Such a timing in the electoral calendar meant that the European 
elections were perceived by the politicians, the media, and the society 
as dress rehearsals for national campaigns. For the incumbent ruling 
party, the elections became an opportunity to confirm support for the 
policies it was pursuing, while the opposition also attempted to dis-
credit the government in respect of its domestic policy. However, the 
domination of domestic matters in the European campaign discourse, 
as well as a low voter turnout, seem to indicate that the European elec-
tions have been treated by Polish political actors as secondary to their 
national concerns thus far. The programs succeeded in mobilizing 
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13 647 311 out of 30 118 852 eligible voters to take part in the election. 
Around 1 377 621 voters did not get their representatives in the EP (the 
so-called wasted vote).1 A total of 112 390 votes were invalid.
Six nationwide ‘electoral committees’ (meaning factions or coali-
tions of factions) were officially registered. Most of them were created 
shortly before the EP elections, but they included some of the 81 active 
parties. They were Konfederacja KORWiN Liroy Braun Narodowcy 
(KKLBN) – an alliance of Eurosceptic parties like KORWiN, Ruch 
Narodowy, Liroy i Skuteczni, Grzegorz Braun with supporters and 
pro-life movements; the center-left Robert Biedron’s Spring (Wiosna) 
operating in the Polish political scene from June 2018; the European 
Coalition (Koalicja Europejska–KE), which included long-established 
parties such as the broadly centrist Civic Platform (Platforma Oby-
watelska–PO), the agrarian and Christian Democratic Polish People’s 
Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe–PSL), the liberal Modern (Now-
oczesna–.N), the pro-environment Green Party (Partia Zieloni–Zielo-
ni), and the Social Democratic Alliance of the Democratic Left (Sojusz 
Lewicy Demokratycznej–SLD); Left Together (Lewica Razem–LR) 
bringing together left-wing parties like Razem, Unia Pracy (UP) and 
Ruch Sprawiedliwości Społecznej (RSS). The others – Law and Jus-
tice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość–PiS) and Kukiz’15 (K’15) – were for-
mally registered in the same form as in the 2015 general elections.
The research question raised in the article addresses the media’s 
presentation of the programs of the Polish political parties in the 
campaign for European Parliament (EP) elections in 2019. Attempts 
were made to identify the visions for the European Union outlined by 
the media as proposed by each of the political groupings. In addition, 
the media representations of the programs were juxtaposed with the 
1 Data from: Obwieszczenie Państwowej Komisji Wyborczej z dnia 27 maja 2019 r. o 
wynikach wyborów posłów do Parlamentu Europejskiego przeprowadzonych w dniu 
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programs defined by the parties’ program declarations. The attempt 
to reconstruct the vision of the European Union contained in the pro-
grams of Polish political parties and the manner of their presentation 
in the media, as described in the article, supplements the previous 
analyses. Since the media are the central and most important source 
of information about politics, as argued by Adam Shehat and Jesper 
Strömbäck,2 the findings regarding the knowledge they convey may 
constitute a starting point for research on the preferences of Polish 
voters. This issue is even more relevant as the events taking place in 
the European Union, such as Brexit or the preceding migration crisis, 
spur the redefinition of the vision of future integration by member 
states and the community itself. 
The analysis aims to answer the following questions:
Q1. What visions (political agenda) of the European Union were 
included in the programs of Polish political parties in the campaign 
to the European Parliament elections in 2019?
Q2. What was the media agenda regarding the political programs 
of Polish parties in the campaign to the European Parliament elec-
tions in 2019?
Q3. To what extent did the media agenda coincide with the polit-
ical agenda?
Q4. How were the political party programs evaluated and to what 
extent did the political sympathies of media entities influence the 
presentation/bias of such an evaluation?
In the analysis, an effort was made confirm the existence of media 
narrative construction patterns specified in previous studies. These 
patterns include personalization, tabloidization, simplification, 
de-ideologization, or the construction of information according to 
“criteria factors” (e.g. Jasper Strömbäck, Johann Galtung and Maria 
Holmboe Ruge).
2 Shehat A., Strömbäck J., “Mediation of Political Realities. Media as Crucial Sources 
of Information”, Esser F., Strömbäck J., Mediatization of Politics. Understanding the 
Transformation of Western Democracies, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, p. 93.
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The research assumptions are reflected in the structure of the arti-
cle, which includes the presentation of theoretical assumptions, dis-
cussion of the research methodology, presentation and comparison of 
the political and media agendas, and the conclusion.
1. Media Coverage of the Electoral Process:  
Theoretical Basis
Analysis of media coverage of electoral processes is usually carried 
out in reference to four theoretical approaches: gatekeeping,3 agenda 
setting,4 information values5 or framing.6 These approaches make it 
3 Shoemaker P. J., Vos T. P., Gatekeeping, an Integrated Approach to Communication 
Theory and Research, D. W. Stacks, M. B. Salwen, New York: Taylor & Francis, 2009, 
p. 75–87; Shoemaker P. J., Vos T. P., Gatekeeping Theory, New York: Routledge, 
2009; Barzilai Nahon K., “Gatekeeping: A Critical Review”, Annual Review of 
Information Science and Technology 43 (1), 2009, p. 433–478; Young L., Soroka S., 
“Affective News: The Automated Coding of Sentiment in Political Texts”, Political 
Communication 29, 2012, p. 205–231; Singer J. B., “User-generated Visibility: 
Secondary Gatekeeping in a Shared Media Space”, New Media & Society 16 (1), 2014, 
p. 55–73.
4 Berkowitz M., “Product Shape as a Design Innovation Strategy”, Journal of Product 
Innovation Management 4, 1987, p. 274–283; Pritchard D., Berkowitz D., “The 
Limits of Agenda-Setting: The Press and Political Responses to Crime in the United 
States, 1950–1980”, International Journal of Public Opinion Research 5 (1), 1993, 
p. 86–91; McCombs M., Ustanawianie agendy. Media masowe i opinia publiczna, 
Kraków, 2008; Walgrave S., Soroka S., Nuytemans M., “The Mass Media’s 
Political Agenda-Setting Power: A Longitudinal Analysis of Media, Parliament, and 
Government in Belgium (1993 to 2000)”, Comparative Political Studies 41 (6), 2008, 
p. 814–836, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414006299098>; Atkinson M. L., Lovet J., 
Baumgartner F. R., “Measuring the Media Agenda”, Political Communication 31 (2), 
2012, p. 355–380.
5 Galtung J., Ruge M. H., “The Structure of Foreign News. The Presentation of the 
Congo, Cuba and Cyprus Crise, four Norwegian newspapers”, Journal of Peace 
Research 2 (1), 1965, p. 64–91; Stijn J., Ansgard H., Wöhlert R., “Fifty Years of 
Galtung and Ruge: Reflections on their Model of News Values and its Relevance for 
the Study of Journalism and Communication Today”, Communication and Media 
36/2016, 2016, p. 5–28.
6 Entman R. M., “Framing: Towards Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm”, Journal 
of Communication 43 (4), 1993, p. 51–58; Scheufele D. A., “Agenda-Setting, 
Priming, and Framing Revisited: Another Look at Cognitive Effects of Political 
Communications”, Mass Communication & Society 3 (2), 2009, p. 297–316.
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possible to explain the role of the media in the process of political 
communication7 and identify the specificities of an electoral campaign.
Among the theoretical approaches, agenda-setting and framing 
were important to the analysis of the relationship between the media 
agenda and the political agenda. Firstly, they directed the research in 
terms of the search for events, cases and information that were in the 
media’s scope of interest at that time. Secondly, they made it possible 
to indicate which of the topics of the party’s political programs in 
the elections to the European Parliament were covered by the media. 
These concepts are frequently used in the analysis of media rela-
tions, although sometimes researchers do not agree on how to assess 
their mutual relations. For example, McCombs groups the setting 
and framing agenda under the same theoretical approach.8 The agen-
da-setting is considered crucial, and the framing only treats its sec-
ond level as a complement. In this approach, agenda-setting means 
that the media can only tell the consumer what to think about, and 
framing allows the consumer to see that the media also influences 
the audience in terms of interpreting events, by telling the consumer 
how to think about them. Such an interpretation of agenda setting 
corresponds to constructivism, the research perspective the authors 
have adopted, in which it is assumed that social reality is actively 
constructed and not discovered by people.9 
The analysis also uses four theoretical concepts: information 
values, mediatization, tabloidization and personalization. They are 
particularly helpful in analyzing and understanding the processes 
taking place in political communication, including during election 
7 Blumler J. G., McQuail D., Political Communication Scholarship: The Uses of 
Election Research, Katz Elihu i Warshel Yael (eds.), Election Studies: What’s 
Their Use?, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001, p. 219–246; Scheufele D. A., 
Tewksbury D. H., “Framing, Agenda setting, and Priming. The Evolution of Three 
Media Effects Models”, Journal of Communication 57, 2007, p. 9–20.
8 McCombs M., “A Look at Agenda-setting: Past, Present and Future”, Journalism 
Studies 6/4, 2005.
9 Von Glasersfeld E., “Constructivism”, Craighead W. E., Nemeroff Ch. B. (eds.), The 
Concise Corsini Encyclopedia of Psychology and Behavioral Science, New York–
Chichester, 2004, p. 219.
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campaigns. In the case of the analysis, they had a significant impact 
on the shape of the code key.
An important issue concerning the media image of politics is the 
choice of content. The theory of the value of information proposed 
by Johan Galtung and Mari Roug assumes that in order to become 
news, an event must meet certain criteria (12): it should be related to 
people, it should be unexpected, it should be as expected, or it should 
be negative. According to this concept, the more validity criteria an 
event meets, the more interesting it is for the media. The taxonomy 
proposed by Galtung and Roug has become the basis of numerous 
analyses regarding the manner in which the media reports events,10 
and, despite critical voices, it is still considered a leading theory in 
media content research by classical media science theorists.11 
The mediatization of politics assumes that the media is an au-
tonomous and competitive force striving to dominate the political 
sphere, which is manifested in the process of translating the prin-
ciples and logic of media operation into the political system.12 Re-
search using the concept ‘mediatization’ of the world of politics 
treats it as a general approach,13 referring it to political actors,14 pro-
10 Brighton P., Foy D., News Values, Sage Publications, Los Angeles, London, New 
Delhi, Singapore, 2007; Harcup T., O’Neill D., “What is News? Galtung and Ruge 
Revisited”, Journalism Studies 2/2, 2001; Bell A., The Language of News Media, 
Oxford: Blackwell, 1991.
11 McQuail D., Teorie komunikowania masowego [Theories of Mass Communication], 
PWN, Warszawa, 2007, p. 169.
12 Meyen M., “Medialisierung”, Medien und Kommunikationswissenschaft 1, 2009, p. 30.
13 E.g. Strömbäck J., “Mediatization of Politics: Towards a Conceptual Framework for 
Comparative Research”, Bucy E. P. (ed.), Sourcebook for Political Communication 
Research: Methods, Measures, and Analytical Techniques, New York: Routledge, 
2011, p. 367–382; Hajer M. A., Authoritative Governance: Policy-Making in the 
Age of Mediatization, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 244; Schulz W., 
“Reconstructing Mediatisation as an Analytical Concept”, European Journal of 
Communication 19 (1), 2004, p. 87–101.
14 Elmelund-Praestekaer Ch., Hopmann D. N., Norgaard A., “Does Mediatization 
Change MP-Media Interaction and MP Attitudes towards the Media? Evidence from 
a Longitudinal Study of Danish MPs”, International Journal of Press/Politics 16 (3), 
2011, p. 382–403.
ISSN 1392-1681   eISSN 2424-6034   Politologija 2020/2 (98)
114
cesses,15 institutions,16 or the reception of politics.17 This concept 
was chosen for the analysis because of the assumption that aspects of 
the program media image, political parties, and politicians influence 
election decisions, and that political entities construct this image in a 
way that is attractive to the media, leading to the personalization and 
conventionalization of the media image of politics, and also of pol-
itics itself. Mediatizing politics also results in the perception of the 
political system through the prism of the actions of political leaders, 
who become the main actors of media messages.
Personalization, understood as increasing the focus on non-po-
litical features of individuals, can lead to the proliferation of infor-
mation about personal pseudo-events. It reduces the presented social 
and political reality to individual defeats and victories.18 As a result, 
politics is presented based on personal perspectives, while informa-
tion on political programs of various factions is limited. We can also 
see coverage intimidation – which means ‘a mixing of the private and 
public spheres, intermingling of the two worlds–previously clearly 
15 Sporer-Wagner D., Marcinkowski F., “Is Talk Always Silver and Silence Golden? The 
Mediatisation of Political Bargaining”, Javnost-The Public 17 (2), 2010, p. 5–26.
16 Meyer Ch., “Does European Union Politics Become Mediatized? The Case of the 
European Commission”, Journal of European Public Policy 16 (7), 2010, p. 1047–
1064.
17 Strömbäck J., Kaid L. L., eds., Handbook of Election News Coverage Around the 
World, New York: Routledge, 2008, p. 4–57. The research approaches to mediatisation 
were widely presented in: Marcinkowski F., “Mediatisation of Politics: Reflections on 
the State of the Concept”, Journal of the European Institute for Communication and 
Culture 21, 2014, p. 5–22.
18 Bennett L. W., News: The Politics of Illusion (5th ed.), New York: Longman, 2002, 
p. 45; Silke A., Maier M., “Personalization of Politics: A Critical Review and Agenda 
for Research”, Annals of the International Communication Association 34 (1), 2010, 
p. 214, DOI: 10.1080/23808985.2010.11679101; Hallin D. C., Mancini P., Comparing 
Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004, p. 277–279; McAllister I., The Personalization of Politics, 
Dalton R. J., Klingemann H.-D. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Political Behaviour, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 571–589; Driessens O., Raeymaeckers K., 
Verstraeten H., Vandenbussche S., “Personalization According to Politicians: A 
Practice Theoretical Analysis of Mediatization”, Communications 30 (35), 2010, 
p. 309–326.
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separated in the public space.’19 The method of presentation, rela-
tions with sources and visual presentations, as well as the focus of 
journalistic material on social interactions in the private sphere, also 
create a kind of pseudo-intimacy.20 Most journalistic materials from 
the period of the last European campaign analyzed in the empirical 
part of the article were affected by those ‘sins.’
We also see a tabloidization21 of the coverage of political events 
which, in the view of Frank Esser, can be perceived at the macro 
level ‘as a social phenomenon both instigating and symbolizing ma-
jor changes to the constitution of the society.’22 It can lead to the 
highlighting of sensational, scandalous, and emotionally charged ele-
ments in the coverage. These trends inevitably bring with them nega-
tive effects for democracy.23 According to Jasper Strömbäck, they are 
the outcome of the use of storytelling in the media narration and the 
application of certain techniques such as simplification, polarization, 
intensification, personalization, visualization, stereotyping, or the 
use of a competition framework in politics-related media reporting.24 
The aim of the media in conveying political issues in this way is to 
attract consumer attention.25 
19 Piontek D., Komunikowanie polityczne jako kultura popularna [Political Communi-
cation as Popular Culture], Poznań: Wydawnictwo Naukowe WNPiD UAM, 2011, 
p. 124.
20 Hirdman A., Kleberg M., Widestedt K., “The Intimization of Journalism. Transforma-
tions of Medialized Public Spheres”, Nordicom Review 26, 2005, p. 111.
21 The term tabloidisation is sometimes used only for the print media. In the presented 
analysis, the term is used both for the print and electronic media.
22 Esser F., “Tabloidization of News. A Comparative Analysis of Anglo-American and 
German Press Journalism”, European Journal of Communication 14 (3), 1999, p. 293.
23 Silke A., Maier M., “Personalization of Politics: A Critical Review and Agenda for 
Research”, Annals of the International Communication Association 34 (1), 2010, 
p. 214, DOI: 10.1080/23808985.2010.11679101; Bennett L. W., News: The Politics 
of Illusion (5th ed.), New York: Longman, 2002; Holtz-Bacha Ch., “Personalisiert und 
emotional: Strategien des modernen Wahlkampfes”, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 7, 
2006, p. 11–19.
24 Strömbäck J., “Four Phases of Mediatization: An Analysis of the Mediatization of 
Politics”, The International Journal of Press/Politics 13 (3), 2008, p. 228–246.
25 Strömbäck J., Esser F., “Shaping Politics: Mediatisation and Media Interventionism”, 
Lundby K. (ed.), Mediatization: Concepts, Changes, Consequences, New York: Petr 
Lang, 2009, p. 213.
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2. Methodological Assumptions
The aim of the research is based on the theory and methodology of 
agenda-setting, the observation of the media agenda during the cam-
paign for European Parliament elections in 2019, and the juxtaposi-
tion of strictly program-related problems with the so-called political 
agenda consisting of the election programs of the six committees. The 
comparative analysis allowed for the determination of the alignment 
of the media and political agenda. This made it possible to answer the 
question about the extent to which the media messages selected for 
the analysis reflect the program offer presented to voters.
The analysis of all election committee programs was used to for-
mulate the political agenda. First, the focus was on establishing a list 
of documents containing the electoral program. Most of the regis-
tered election committees had an official program (Wiosna,26 KE,27 
PiS,28 Partia Razem29 forming the backbone of LR, and K’1530). The 
program framework of the other political factions KKLBN emerged 
in political spot ads and official remarks of their leaders and can-
didates. A content analysis of these documents enabled defining in 
the programs presented, to varying degrees, the views of different 
factions on the future shape of the EU and the policies they pursue 
currently, Poland’s position in the organization and the international 
arena, as well as domestic political issues.
26 Europa dla Ciebie. Europejski program Wiosny [Europe for you. European Program of 
Spring], available at: <https://wiosnabiedronia.pl/program>, accessed August 2019.
27 Deklaracja Przyszłość Polski Wielki Wybór [Declaration. The Future of Poland. 
The great choice], available at: <https://koalicjaeuropejska.pl/deklaracja>, accessed 
August 2019.
28 Zasobna Polska w Silnej Europie [Wealthy Poland in Strong Europe], available at: 
<http://pis.org.pl/aktualnosci/mamy-najlepszy-plan-dla-zasobnej-polski-w-silnej-
europie>, accessed August 2019.
29 Nowy Ład dla Europy Program na wybory do Parlamentu Europejskiego Europejska 
Wiosna 2019 [New Deal for Europe. Program for the European Parliament 
Elections European Spring 2019], available at: <http://partiarazem.pl/wp-content/
uploads/2019/05/nowy_lad_dla_europy-kwiecien_2019.pdf>, accessed August 2019.
30 Manifest Europejski Kukiz [European Manifesto Kukiz], available at: <achajko.pl/
pliki/Manifest-Europejski-Kukiz.pdf>, accessed August 2019.
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To determine the media agenda through an examination of journal-
istic material both qualitative as well as, to a limited extent, quantitative 
content analysis were applied. The aim of the triangulation of research 
methods was to ensure the greater accuracy and verifiability of find-
ings. The authors chose a comprehensive approach to the news media 
agenda. There have been numerous analyses of Polish media content, 
many which were conducted over many years, including those by the 
authors of this article. They clearly indicate the existence of a phenom-
enon that can be described as a strong politicization, which is apparent 
in the biases displayed by the media.31 According to the five-degree 
politicization scale developed by J. Blumler and M. Gurevitch, we see 
the second highest degree of politicization, or a voluntary association 
of an outlet with a party, in most Polish news media, and the highest 
degree of politicization in the case of public broadcasters (radio and 
television), which the current ruling coalition has total control over.32
Although the structure of the television audience is changing 
(people aged 55+ made up half of can be identified viewers in 2018), 
television remains the primary medium in Poland. Almost all house-
holds have a television set, 95.2% according to our data. The so-
called ‘big four’ universal channels have the biggest share in the tel-
evision market. Polsat – 10.23%, TVP1 – 9.73%, TVN – 9.38% and 
TVP2 – 8.16%. According to public opinion polls on media reliabili-
ty conducted by CBOS in May 2019, it appears that 38% of respond-
ents do not consider TVP news and programs on current affairs to be 
reliable. One of the most important reasons for this significant loss of 
credibility is the apparent politicization of content.33
31 Jas-Koziarkiewicz M., “Polish Opinion Weeklies about Brexit in 2015 and 2016”, On-
line Journal Modelling the New Europe 29, 2019, p. 78–107; Stasiak-Jazukiewicz E., 
“The Image of the EU in Polish Magazines. Based on the Analysis of the Contents of 
“Polityka”, “Wprost” and “Newsweek” published in 2013”, Przegląd Europejski 4, 
2015, p. 68–89.
32 Blumler J., Gurevitch M., The Crisis of Public Communication, London: Routledge, 
1995, p. 64–65.
33 CBOS, Odbiór kampanii wyborczej i aktywność polityczna w internecie przed 
wyborami do Parlamentu Europejskiego [Perception of the EP Election Campaign and 
the Internet Activity before the EP Election], 86/2019, p. 5.
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According to a report prepared by the Reuters Institute for the Study 
of Journalism (RISJ), the internet media (including social media) is 
already the main source of information. In 2019, it was mentioned by 
86% of the surveyed Polish inhabitants, television, by 76%, and the 
press, by only 25%.34 The most visited portals include onet.pl, wp.pl 
and interia.pl as well as online pages of the traditional media.
The change in media consumption has mainly affected the press, 
particularly daily newspapers. Despite a gradual decrease in circula-
tion numbers, they continue to play a significant role in the process of 
shaping public opinion. According to CBOS, the most popular source 
of information about committees and candidates during the campaign 
preceding the vote for EP representatives were news and opinion pro-
gram broadcasts on television (63%). The Poles also derived their 
knowledge from election advertising in radio and television (52%); 
from their friends and family members (39%); from leaflets, posters 
and billboards (35%); from radio broadcasts on political topics (34%), 
from information sources on the Internet (26%); from the press (22%); 
(5%) – from individual conversations with candidates (5%), and 3% – 
from election rallies and meetings they participated in. Internet sources 
were mostly used by the Poles under 45, while those over 55 men-
tioned TV coverage as the main source of information.35
Following the model of media consumption in Poland and CBOS 
data on the most popular sources of information about committees 
and candidates during the European campaign, the analysis covered 
journalistic material originating from the following:
• the main editions of news programmes broadcast in three 
nationwide TV stations – the public TVP 1 (‘Wiadomości’ 
at 19.30) and the private TVN (‘Fakty’ at 19.00) and Polsat 
(‘Wydarzenia’ at 18.50); 
34 Reuters Institute, Digital News Report 2019, p. 101.
35 CBOS, Odbiór kampanii wyborczej i aktywność polityczna w internecie przed 
wyborami do Parlamentu Europejskiego [Perception of the EP Election Campaign and 
the Internet Activity before the EP Election], 86/2019, p. 1 and 3.
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• three nationwide daily newspapers of general interest: Gazeta 
Wyborcza (GW), Gazeta Polska Codziennie (GPC) and Rzec-
zpospolita (RZ);
• four news portals: wiadomosci.onet.pl, fakty.interia.pl, wPoli-
tyce.pl, naTemat.pl.
As for the media type, the unit of analysis was a press article or a 
news piece in the case of news portals and television programs. All of 
them came from 13 days selected on the basis of a random stratified 
sample. The selection was made using the concept of a constructed 
week, which assumes a random choice of individual days of the week 
from among those identified in the period examined.36 The draw was 
made from the outset of the 2019 election campaign, i.e. from Febru-
ary 25 to May 24 (electoral silence lasted from 00:00 on May 25 to 
21:00 on May 26). Taking into account the specific character of the 
media – reporting events on consecutive days – it was decided that 
one week could only be drawn once. In addition, materials published 
on May 27 were included in the analysis – paper editions of daily 
newspapers are not published on Sundays, and the main editions of 
news programs conclude before the end of electoral silence – in order 
to maintain balance, and online media was analyzed on the 27th rather 
than on the 26th of May (See: Appendix 1). 
The research assumptions influenced the analytical process by di-
viding it into two stages. The first stage included the separation of all 
news regarding the elections to the European Parliament published 
by selected media in the analyzed period, and the definition of central 
topics. The second stage included a qualitative analysis of media con-
tent pertaining to political party programs. The study was conducted 
using a code key (thematic categorization).
One thousand three hundred and two pieces of news (news re-
ports, articles) were qualified as fulfilling research criteria for quanti-
36 Riffe D., Aust Ch. F., Lacy S. R., “The Effectiveness of Random, Consecutive Day and 
Constructed Week Sampling in Newspaper Content Analysis”, Journalism and Mass 
Communication Quarterly 70 (1), 1993, p. 134.
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tative analysis. The categorization key was constructed based on the 
main topical threads of European campaign materials. This made it 
possible to determine the agenda of the news media on the selected 
days of the European campaign (Table 1). The media agenda is a list 
of topics which, according to the source of the message, should ap-
pear at the center of public interest, reaching the public opinion and 
being considered the most important among public issues.
Table 1. The news media agenda on the selected days of the EP campaign.
Topic
The number of journalistic reports on the indicated 





























































Polls 2 6 3 5 3 25 20 14 16 94
Electoral lists and 
candidates 8 7 7 2 8 2 104 15 52 27 232
Political programmes 
including: 3 9 10 4 9 3 59 9 28 25 159
K’15 1 1
KE 2 2 4 1 21 7 7 44
KKLBN 1 1 1 2 1 3 9
PiS 1 6 7 2 4 2 24 8 18 13 86
Wiosna 11 1 1 1 14
LR 1 1 1 3
Comparison of a selected 
few 2 2
Comparison of all 1 1
Campaign progress and 
campaigning assessment 4 2 8 5 4 6 71 13 37 43 193
Reports on current events 3 5 3 9 9 5 111 7 44 39 235
Other 4 2 3 2 2 2 17 10 9 51
Campaign-time materials 
in total 24 25 37 25 37 21 445 73 185 159 1031
Election results 9 2 3 3 6 3 73 17 81 74 271
Total 33 27 40 28 43 24 518 90 266 233 1302
Source: Compilation by Marta Jas-Koziarkiewicz and Ewa Stasiak-Jazukiewicz.
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In total, the most numerous category was media reports on elec-
tion results. The distribution was different in individual media out-
lets. Only GW and fakty.interia.pl devoted the most space to news 
within this category. The second most numerous topical thread was, 
as befits the news media, reports on current campaign-related events 
such as the backing which Frans Timmermans, the deputy head of 
the EC, extended to Wiosna; the lecture by Donald Tusk at the Uni-
versity of Warsaw, given in relation to the May 3rd Constitution Day; 
controversial speech by Leszek Jażdżewski given right before the 
speech of Donald Tusk, in which Jażdżewski claimed that the Pol-
ish Church is actually against the Gospel and Christ; the March for 
Europe – demonstrations of supporters of European integration; the 
March for Equality – whose participants demonstrated support for 
the rights of minorities, in particular sexual, and opposed to discrim-
ination; predictions regarding a possible resignation of finance min-
ister Teresa Czerwińska due to her reluctance to lend credence to the 
social promises made by PiS (the so-called Kaczyński Five – 500 
plus for every child, thirteenth pension, lower PIT for the young, re-
duction in labor costs and the reactivation of bus services between 
smaller towns); used by the opposition in the pre-election campaign 
the teachers’ strike; compensation for heirless Jewish property – a 
controversial topic that is regularly mentioned in pre-election cam-
paigns in Poland, and finally the dubious land deal of Prime Minister 
Mateusz Morawiecki, which was considered to be detrimental to the 
state treasury.
The third thread was the presentation of lists and candidates them-
selves. The number of materials on this topic confirms the personali-
zation of not only the election campaign itself, but also the campaign 
coverage. For a similar reason, the campaign itself drew the interest 
of the media under examination – remarks of individual politicians 
and reporting on activities they undertook were an immanent part 
of covering conventions or meetings with voters. Down in the fifth 
place (out of seven categories) were materials on the main subject of 
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the paper – political programs. Only reports on the results of succes-
sive election polls (94) and reports on other election-related topics 
(51) like EP elections in other EU states and the EU’s cohesion policy 
were less numerous. The main conclusion of the study concerns the 
coherence of specific media agendas. The small differences observed 
between relations resulted mainly from the defining characteristics of 
a particular type of media. For example, Internet portals, providing 
unlimited space, dealt with the subject more often and in a wider con-
text. Printed journals, having more time to prepare their materials, 
analyzed the topics in depth, while the coverage of television news 
programs was the most superficial.
3. Media Agenda vs. Political Agenda
In order to compare the media agenda with the political agenda, the 
researchers applied content analysis, firstly to party programs or oth-
er documents, and secondly to 159 news items presenting party elec-
tion programs.
The political program, i.e. a set of goals and projects of a given 
party and the candidates being representatives of each party, is a list 
of activities planned for implementation after election victory. For 
voters, it provides information as to which grouping or candidate 
will best meet their needs or expectations. Most of the election com-
mittees joined the campaign without specific programs. Individual 
points were presented only during the campaign. One of the reasons 
was the coalition nature of the committees formed by several parties 
that differ significantly in character, along with their adopted strat-
egies, which were a reaction to the actions of the competition. The 
strategy also favored proposals aimed at attracting voters’ attention 
over the presentation of a well-considered plan on the direction that 
EU development should take. The study identified 33 political topics 
in the analyzed programs from the following five areas: EU insti-
tutional reforms; community policies; the values on which the EU 
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is founded; actions taken for the benefit of EU citizens and the role 
of Poland in the EU, as well as proposals concerning internal affairs 
(See: Appendix 2).
An analysis of six political programs shows that only two com-
mittees (PiS and Kukiz’15) presented the idea of reforming EU insti-
tutions. PiS proposed to strengthen the role of national parliaments 
in the decision-making process and called for the introduction of the 
so-called red card system for projects of EU legal acts. On the other 
hand, Kukiz’15 postulated strengthening the role of the EP at the 
expense of other institutions, especially the European Commission. 
All programs contained references to common policies. At the same 
time, leftist groups (Wiosna and LR) proposed their extension to new 
areas, such the harmonization of health care standards or a housing 
program for Europeans (Wiosna) and the reduction of working time, 
change of patent law, reduction of drug prices and integration of tax-
es for all companies in the EU (LR). The right-wing groups (PiS, 
Kukiz’15 and KKLBN) were in favor of limiting the current taxes. 
The values on which United Europe should be founded were rec-
ognized to varying degrees. The category particularly differentiating 
the groups was the belief that Member States should maintain their 
sovereignty. Three committees (Wiosna, LR and EC) declared that 
some part of sovereignty could be relinquished to the EU, and other 
three declared the need for Member States to maintain or regain full 
sovereignty. KKLBN stood out by its unwillingness to grant gender 
equality and full rights to LGBT communities, perceiving it as an 
attempt to make socially undesirable civilization changes in Poland. 
The role of Poland in the EU was seen differently. The introduction of 
the euro currency in Poland was strongly opposed in two of the ana-
lyzed programs (Kukiz’15 and KKLBN). PiS expressed its consent 
to replace the national currency with a European one when Poland 
reaches an economic level comparable to that in Germany. The PiS 
program contained a developed social package, created for domestic 
needs. 
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The image of the European Union as proposed by political par-
ties reaches voters through the media. According to theoretical as-
sumptions, the media becomes a gate, or filter, determining not only 
what information is transmitted, but also how the issues are presented 
(agenda setting, framing, information value). This prompts the ques-
tion of how the media presents party programs.
First, quantitative content analysis indicates that the committee 
programs did not enjoy equal media coverage. More than half of 
the news presenting political programs was about the proposals of 
PiS. The second object of media interest was the program of KE, 
the third – that of Wiosna. The programs of KKLBN, LR and K’15 
were barely mentioned on the analyzed days. Those who believe in 
the powerful influence of the media can invoke this data – only three 
election committees, the programs of which were most often present-
ed in the media, obtained the seats. Without stressing the impact of the 
disproportionate media coverage, the reasons behind the concentra-
tion of interest on those programs should still be listed. Undoubtedly, 
the factors mentioned above are significant in this regard (criterial 
factors). According to these factors, news items which relate to major 
actors in the political scene are prioritized. This approach perhaps 
dictated the overrepresentation of the ruling party (PiS) and the main 
opposition force (KE) in news items. Secondly, important thing was 
choices made regarding the relevance of news – dictated by limited 
broadcasting time, newspaper size, and the perceived capabilities of 
consumers. The outcome was that only information that was impor-
tant for the consumer was presented and the risk of making informa-
tion less attractive by the presentation of the full spectrum of points 
of view was not taken. According to Hans Bernd Brosius, Klaus Got-
to, Dietmar Haak and Hans Mathias Keppler, apart from selecting 
information, the impact on the process of building the media agenda 
has a ‘production’ of pseudo-events.37 The PiS and KE election cal-
37 Kepplinger H. M., Gotto K., Brosius H. B., Haak D., Der Einfluss der Fernsehnach-
richten auf die politische Meinungsbildung, Freiburg, Breisgau, 1989.
125
Ewa Stasiak-Jazukiewicz et al. A Vision of the European Union: A Study of Media Coverage...
endar abounded with numerous conventions, picnics, marches, and 
events during which new program points were delivered, and which 
were successively reported on by the media. The phrase ‘people are 
interested in something new, in surprise,’ as emphasized by Tom Har-
cup and O’Neill Deirdre, describes why potential voters may be in-
terested in the new political grouping – Wiosna.38 Thus, the results of 
the analysis confirm the findings made so far by researchers using the 
concepts of agenda-setting and the mediatization of politics (visible 
in tabloidization and personalization in media narration).
A reconstruction of the media image of the political programs of-
fered to the Poles in the 2019 European campaign makes it easier to 
compare the political agenda and the media agenda (159 news refer-
ring only to the programs). In this case, the media agenda is under-
stood in the traditional way, as a list of issues that the message sender 
believes should be at the center of public interest, reaching the public 
and being treated by the public as most important. Thirty-four issues 
were identified, one more than on the political agenda. An item titled 
political programme was added to the list of issues. That is because 
it happened repeatedly that media outlets restricted their coverage to 
determining whether the program existed or not. Objectivity is ex-
pected from the media in the separation of facts from opinions and 
commentary. Most of the analyzed news can be observed as being bi-
ased. This bias is manifested through original evaluative commentary 
and the use of emotionally marked phrases to reward certain political 
views. Its purpose does not facilitate rational decision-making by the 
voter.
The assumption that the presentation of a given issue translates 
into its perception by the recipients allowed the evaluation of cogni-
tive and affective attributes of the issues through the content analysis. 
The study used a scale dividing issues into categories of ‘critical,’ 
38 Harcup T., O’Neill D., “What is News? Galtung and Ruge Revisited”, Journalism 
Studies 2/2, 2001, p. 261–280.
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‘apologetic,’ and ‘objective.’39 In addition to media visibility, the 
impact of the report helps to define the importance of the topic and 
facilitates identification (See: Appendix 3).
The analysis leads to the conclusion that the programs of only three 
election committees – PiS, KE and Wiosna – could be pieced together 
from media presentations. The others (K’15, LR and KKLBN) were 
marginalized or even ridiculed, pointing to their reservations about 
Europe, Euroscepticism (KKLBN), or anti-establishment character 
(K’15). 
The comparison of the media agenda to the political agenda leads 
to the following conclusions. First, the media agenda is shorter than 
the political agenda. The issues present in the political programs did 
not enjoy equal interest in the analyzed media. The most attractive 
trait was the fact that the group had an election program. Almost all of 
the analyzed media noted existence of the political programme of PiS 
and European Coalition, half of them noticed the presence of Wiosna 
program and only newspapers noticed programs of remaining elec-
tion committees. The issue of guaranteeing rights for LGBT environ-
ments also frequently appeared in the analyzed news. The reasons for 
the concentration of news on this issue can be placed in a socio-polit-
ical context. During the campaign, the mayor of Warsaw signed the 
LGBT Declaration, which became the subject of discussion among 
all political parties. This event also led to the rise of societal emo-
tions, reflected in numerous equality marches and counter-manifes-
tations organized by social movements supporting ‘traditional family 
values.’ This issue guaranteed the media the desired dramatization of 
the message best achieved by the conflict framework. 
Issues such as Poland’s membership in the Eurozone, EU mem-
bership, the sovereignty of Member States, Christian values, and 
39 Critical material – the author uses unfavorable words, is critical, uses adjectives 
with a negative connotation; apologetic material – the author of the text uses phrases 
containing approval and acceptance, incl. positive adjectives; neutral material – the 
author reports on an event, presents information in an emotionally unmarked way.
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common policies (energy, climate and migration) have also proven 
to be attractive issues in the media. It may be surprising that the sin-
gle market issue present in each of the analyzed programs has not 
found any reference in the news. In addition, the least attractive issue 
was free education at all levels (in the PiS program), the fight against 
corruption and protection of animal rights, and the protection of the 
elderly – all issues proposed by Wiosna. Other less attractive issues 
were the fight against organized crime (Wiosna), social solidarity 
present in the KE and LR programs, consumer protection proposed 
by PiS and LR, the uniform European passport (Wiosna), e-democ-
racy and elements of direct democracy from the Kukiz’15 program, 
support for the media promoting democracy postulated by Wiosna, 
protection of the disabled (Wiosna and KE programs), and, finally, 
tax harmonization as proposed by Wiosna and LR (See: Appendix 3).
Secondly, the news were politically marked. The divisions between 
supporters of the authorities and the opposition were clear. No media 
entity surrendered the possibility of addressing only its proven recipi-
ents. Few news programs, especially election programs, were objective 
in tone, with the dominance of both positive and negative attitudes. 
These programs used the framework of struggle or war and a wide 
range of expression, such as journalistic commentary, confrontation of 
candidates for MEPs with past issues, or the selection of issues, leading 
to the elimination of some and over-representation of others.
Using the division proposed by Jay G. Blumler, some of the ana-
lyzed media advocating for the ruling majority served as government 
spokespersons.40 Voters learned from PiS supporters media (GPC, 
Wiadomości TVP 1 and wPolityce.pl) that the party advocates a di-
rection of European integration that provides Poland and the Poles 
with development opportunities in a solidarity-based Europe of 
Homelands holding Christian values which guided its Founding Fa-
40 Blumler J. G., McQuail D., Political Communication Scholarship: The Uses of Elec-
tion Research, Katz E., Warshel Y. (eds.), Election Studies: What’s Their Use?, Boul-
der, CO: Westview Press, 2001, p. 125.
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thers. The integration process is advanced enough, the organization 
itself does not require structural changes, only a fairer treatment of 
its member states. Those who can secure Polish interests are the can-
didates of PiS – the party focused on a fair distribution of wealth 
(social transfers). The KE Election Committee, according to those 
media, has no vision of the EU itself or Poland’s role in the organi-
zation. Representatives of its component parties defend the interests 
of foreign countries (mainly Germany), consume (or plunder, to put 
it more bluntly) the wealth generated by the Poles. The ideologically 
hostile proposals of Wiosna, on the other hand, threaten the integrity 
of the family, the collapse of nation states, and devastation of tradi-
tional European civilization (See: Appendix 3). 
KE media supporters (GW, Fakty TVN and naTemat.pl), referring 
to the program proposals of this election committee, painted a vision 
of deepening the process of European integration (e.g. new climate 
and health policies), building a strong EU where Poland would play a 
significant role. The other analyzed media (RZ, Wydarzenia, Wiado-
mości.onet.pl and fakty.interia.pl) tried to retain the appearance of 
objectivity, referring to all the program proposals with at least some 
distance, or even critically (See: Appendix 3).
Conclusions
A study of the political programs of Polish election committees shows 
that they lacked a vision for the direction of the development of the 
European Union. Postulates during the 2019 election campaign were 
formulated on an ad hoc basis and for the needs of domestic politics, 
as in references to LGBT. The few issues on which all election com-
mittees took a position were the question of the position of member 
states in EU structures (sovereignty) and Christian values. However, 
even in this case, these issues were presented through a narrow per-
spective, limited to the ‘Polish backyard.’
Regarding the second research question, the presented analysis 
results confirm media logic well-documented in literature, charac-
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terized by the shallowness of the media discourse, manifested in 
the limitation of the spectrum of undertaken issues and creation of 
political information in reference to individual politicians, meaning 
personalization of relations. Result of the analysis confirms the find-
ings of previous researchers, such as the definition of criterial factors 
(common news criteria), which include media attractiveness and the 
sensationalist character of information in a decisive role, as specified 
by Johann Galtung and Maria Holmboe Ruge.41
In addition, the similarity of the agendas of the analyzed me-
dia (such as insufficient information on program proposals of LR, 
Kukiz’15 or KKLBN) could deprive citizens of conscious participa-
tion in the election process.
The media image of the programs of Polish political parties dur-
ing the 2019 EP electoral campaign was marked by a deficit of reflec-
tion on a comprehensive, long-term vision of EU development. In 
other words, on the basis of the analysis of media relations, it was not 
possible to reconstruct the vision of the development of the European 
Union proposed by the political parties. The media debate was domi-
nated by ad hoc topics, often of secondary importance. The focus was 
on easy-to-cover proposals concerning domestic issues – mainly so-
cial promises. The widespread politicization of content was reflected 
in the selective presentations of program items, favoring the creation 
of biased images of the programs as well as of parties themselves and 
their representatives. 
The verification of the third research question concerned the com-
pliance of the vision of EU development contained in the programs 
of Polish political parties with the vision presented in media reports. 
The comparison of the media agenda to the political agenda concludes 
that the media agenda is shorter than the political agenda. Furthermore, 
the media process was not conducive to providing a wide offer of po-
41 Galtung J., Holmboe R. M., “The Structure of Foreign News. The Presentation of 
the Congo, Cuba and Cyprus Crise, four Norwegian Newspapers”, Journal of Peace 
Research 2 (1), 1965, p. 64–91.
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litical visions of the EU for Poles. This has important ramifications. 
The establishment of a media agenda inadequate to the political agenda 
during an election campaign may result in hasty election decisions. 
It also encourages political entities to limit their program proposals 
to those that will arouse media interest, sometimes even encouraging 
them to resign from the political program in favor of building election 
campaigns based on individual politicians. The obtained results of the 
analysis confirm the developing process of the mediatization of politics 
observed by media experts and political scientists. 
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Appendix 1. The research sample – constructed week.
Day of the week Campaign week number Date
Monday 9 22 April
Tuesday 4 19 March
Wednesday 2 6 March
Thursday 3 14 March
Friday 11 10 May
Saturday 10 4 May
Sunday 6 7 April
Monday 5 25 March
Tuesday 13 21 May
Wednesday 8 17 April
Thursday 7 11 April
Friday 1 1 March
Saturday 12 18 May
Monday 14 27 May
Source: Authors’ compilation (Marta Jas-Koziarkiewicz).
Appendix 2. The political agenda in the election programmes.
Political issues Wiosna LR KE PiS K’15 KKLBN
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Reform of EU 
institutions limited limited 
Common policies including:
the single market yes yes Yes yes yes exclusively
Regional development 
and the cohesion fund yes yes yes yes yes No
Agricultural yes yes Yes yes yes No
Energy yes yes Yes limited no No
Climate yes yes Yes limited no No
Migration yes yes Yes no no No
Security yes yes Yes yes yes No
Rule of law yes yes Yes No
Support for media 
promoting democracy yes
Health care yes Yes No
Consumer protection yes
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Political issues Wiosna LR KE PiS K’15 KKLBN
Protection of the 
disabled yes yes












The values a united Europe should be based on including
Sovereignty of 
member states partial partial partial full full full 
Christian values yes yes Yes yes yes Yes
Gender equality yes yes Yes yes yes No
LGBT+ rights yes yes Yes No
Social solidarity yes
Pro-citizen actions including:
Supporting the youth yes yes Yes
Protecting the right of 




Eslements of direct 
democracy yes
E-democracy yes
Poland in the EU including:
Membership yes yes restoring position yes yes conditional
Membership in the 
eurozone 




Social package yes 
Free education at all 
levels yes
Source: Authors’ compilation based on the data given in footnotes 4–8.
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Appendix 3. Presence of political agenda issues in 159 news coverage by 
individual media outlets, broken down into election committees with attri-
butes given to each of the reports, where apologetic material – x; critical 







































































PiS x x y x z x y z z
KE x y y x y y y y y
Wiosn z y y y x
LR z
K’15 z z
KKLBN z y z




























PiS y y x x y y y





42 In many cases, several issues were addressed in one material. 
137






































































PiS y y x x y y z
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Rule of law 
protection
PiS y y x x y






































































































































































































































The values a united Europe should be based on including:
sovereignty of 
member states
PiS y x y x z x y y z




KKLBN x z x y
Christian 
values
PiS y x y y x x y y x








KE x x x y











































































PiS y y x y y y
KE x y x x y y y y
Wiosna z y y y x x z
LR z
K’15











right of parents 
to raise their 
children 
PiS z x x x
Protecting the 
right of parents 





























K’15 z z z
KKLBN
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Poland in the EU including:
membership
PiS y x y x z x y x




KKLBN y z z y y
Membership in 
the euro zone
PiS y x y x z x y z z




KKLBN y z y y
Polish domestic issues including:
the so-called 
Kaczyński Five
PiS y x y y x y x y z z
KE y y y y
Wiosna 
LR
K’15
KKLBN
Free education 
at all levels
PiS x
KE
Wiosna 
Free education 
at all levels
LR
K’15
KKLBN
Source: Authors’ compilation.
